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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Paul Meyers appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the
district court’s verdict, entered after a court trial, finding him guilty of grand theft.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Meyers with grand theft after he stole a truck. (R., pp.43-44.)
The district court appointed the Ada County Public Defender’s Office to represent
Meyers. (R., p.21.) D. David Lorello from the Ada County Public Defender’s Office
represented Meyers in several hearings and made numerous routine pretrial filings. (See,
e.g., R., pp.46-51.) Meyers also made several pro se filings, including a motion for a
“change of attorney.” (R., pp.59-64, 66-67, 76-77.) In the motion, Meyers asserted that
Lorello had failed to visit him in jail, and had refused Meyers’ requests to call certain
witnesses at the upcoming trial. (R, pp.66-67.) The court conducted a hearing on
Meyers’ motion, during which Meyers withdrew his request for alternative counsel. (Tr.,
p.7, L.25 – p.21, L.20.)
Meyers waived his right to a jury trial and requested a court trial. (R., pp.70-71;
Tr., p.24, L.10 – p.31, L.12.) However, on the morning of the scheduled court trial,
Lorello expressed concern to the court about Meyers’ mental health and competence to
stand trial. (Tr., p.35, Ls.13-25.) The district court engaged in a dialogue with Meyers
and with the officer who had transported Meyers to the jail that morning. (Tr., p.36, L.1 –
p.50, L.10.) Meyers described, at some length, various organizations and businesses he
believed he was developing while incarcerated. (Tr., p.40, L.8 – p.46, L.6.) The court
also noted that Meyers was wearing a jail-issued sweatshirt underneath a dress shirt and
1

tie. (Tr., p.46, Ls.7-9.) Based upon its observations at the hearing, the district court
ordered a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211. (Tr., p.47, L.14 – p.51,
L.15.)
The evaluator concluded that Meyers was competent to stand trial.

(Sealed

Exhibits, pp.1-6. 1) However, the evaluator also noted that Meyers was refusing mental
health treatment at the jail, and cautioned that “under stress and without the help of
psychiatric intervention, Mr. Meyers may have an exacerbation of his manic symptoms
which would render him not competent to proceed in this case.” (Sealed Exhibits, pp.2,
6.) At a subsequent hearing, the district court granted the state’s request that Meyers
receive a second evaluation.

(Tr., p.54, L.8 – p.61, L.23.)

The second evaluator

concluded that “significant aspects of [Meyers’] psychotic disorder, particularly
hypomanic behaviors and grandiose delusional thinking, would likely interfere with his
ability to rationally assist counsel with his defense, particularly due to the stress and
dynamic aspects of this process which would likely further exacerbate these symptoms.”
(Sealed Exhibits, p.17.) The district court ordered Meyers committed to the Department
of Health and Welfare for mental health treatment. (Tr., p.65, Ls.1-8.) Approximately six
weeks later, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare sent the court a follow-up
evaluation indicating that Meyers had responded well to treatment and was now
competent to stand trial. (Sealed Exhibits, pp.21-23.)
At a subsequent hearing, the district court accepted the conclusion of the
evaluator and re-scheduled the court trial for January 25, 2017. (Tr., p.68, L.11 – p.71,

1

The sealed exhibits from this case are contained within the electronic file, “Meyers
45054 sealed.pdf.” Citations to page numbers of the “Sealed Exhibits” refer to the page
numbers of this file.
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L.18.) During the hearing, Meyers expressed dissatisfaction with the scheduled date and
requested that the court set the court trial for the week between Christmas and New
Year’s Day. (Tr., p.69, L.9 – p.70, L.18.) The district court declined to do so after
Lorello stated he was unavailable that week, and after the prosecutor indicated he was not
sure if the state’s witnesses would be available that week. (Tr., p.70, L.6 – p.71, L.18.)
On the same day as the hearing re-setting the court trial date, Meyers sent a pro se
letter to the district court. (R., pp.82-83.) Meyers again requested that the court trial be
moved to the week between Christmas and New Year’s Day. (R., p.82.) Meyers also
informed the court that he had “fired David Lorello and notified his supervisor Mr.
Geddes.” (Id.) Meyers further stated, “I choose to exercise the right to defend myself in
this matter.” (R., p.83.)
Neither Meyers, defense counsel, the prosecutor, nor the court, subsequently
referenced Meyers’ letter or the statements he made within it for the remainder of the
underlying criminal proceeding.

A different attorney from the Ada County Public

Defender’s Office, Kevin Rogers, represented Meyers at the court trial. (Tr., p.73, Ls.58.) Rogers also represented Meyers at two post-trial hearings and made several post-trial
filings on Meyers’ behalf. (R., pp.92-96; 113-115, 119-121; Tr., pp.208, 244.)
At the conclusion of the court trial, the district court found Meyers guilty of grand
theft. (Tr., p.204, Ls.7-14.) The district court imposed a unified seven-year sentence
with two years fixed, with credit for 353 days served. (R., pp.109-112; Tr., p.238, L.6 –
p.240, L.17.) The court ordered the sentence to run concurrently with a sentence Meyers
was serving for a conviction in Wyoming. (R., pp.109-112; Tr., p.239, Ls.1-2.) Meyers
timely appealed. (R., pp.119-121.)
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ISSUE
Meyers states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court violate Mr. Meyers’ constitutional right of
self-representation, when it ignored his request to proceed pro se?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Meyers failed to show that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
right to represent himself?

4

ARGUMENT
Meyers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Violated His Sixth Amendment
Right To Represent Himself
A.

Introduction
Meyers contends that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by

failing to address his request to proceed pro se made prior to the court trial. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.6-10.)

Meyers’ contention fails because a review of the totality of the

circumstances reveals that his statement of intent to exercise his right of selfrepresentation was not framed as a clear and unequivocal request, and, to the extent
Meyers’ statement constituted a request, Meyers subsequently abandoned it.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises

free review.” Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

C.

Meyers’ Statement Of Intent To Exercise His Right Of Self-Representation Was
Not Framed As A Clear And Unequivocal Request, And, To The Extent Meyers’
Statement Constituted A Request, Meyers Subsequently Abandoned It
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 13,

of the Idaho Constitution both guarantee criminal defendants the right to selfrepresentation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); State v. Folk, 151 Idaho
327, 339, 256 P.3d 735, 747 (2011); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350,
356 (Ct. App. 2006). The right of self-representation, however, is not absolute. Martinez
v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 142, 161-62 (2000); State v.
Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632, 634 (Ct. App. 2002). “Because the right to
5

counsel is also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, … a defendant may waive the right
to counsel and proceed at trial pro se ‘only if the waiver is knowing, intelligent and
voluntary.’” United States v. DeShazer, 554 F.3d 1281, 1287-1288 (10th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted); accord Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865,
781 P.2d 197, 202 (1989); Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356; United States v.
McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 844 (9th Cir. 2003).
The request must also be clear and unequivocal. State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586,
597, 181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 938 F.2d 737, 742743 (7th Cir. 1991); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989); Raulerson v.
Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 808 (11th Cir. 1984)). A request is unequivocal when the court
can be reasonably certain that a defendant wishes to represent himself in lieu of
exercising his right to counsel. See United States v. Carpenter, 680 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2012) (per curiam). This requirement serves to prevent defendants from “taking
advantage of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-representation…by
forcing the defendant to make an explicit choice. If he equivocates, he is presumed to
have requested the assistance of counsel.” State v. Langford, 882 P.2d 490, 493 (Mont.
1994) (quoting Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444). Courts should “indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver” of the right to counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404 (1977).
Additionally, while there is no published Idaho opinion directly on point, several
jurisdictions have held that an unequivocally asserted request for self-representation can
be waived by subsequent words or conduct indicating a change of intention. See, e.g.
Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 38–39 (2nd Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant
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reasonably appeared to abandon his initial request to represent himself by voicing no
dissatisfaction with his attorneys and by not reasserting his desire to proceed pro se);
Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Even if defendant requests to
represent himself, however, the right may be waived through the defendant’s subsequent
conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned the request
altogether”); United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The only
plausible inference from the defendant’s conduct is that he acquiesced in the denial by
judicial inaction of his motion and thereby deliberately relinquished his right of selfrepresentation”); People v. Abdu, 215 P.3d 1265, 1268 (Colo. App. 2009).
In People v. Kenner, 223 Cal. App.3d 56, 58-62 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1990), the trial
court failed to rule on the defendant’s motion to represent himself due to confusion
caused by the defendant’s continuously changing custody situation. On appeal, Kenner
asserted that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.
Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Kenner’s conviction and concluded:
In the present case, the record establishes that appellant had ample
opportunity to call the court’s attention to the neglected Faretta motion,
but did not. Unlike the defendant in Brown v. Wainwright, supra, 665 F.2d
607, who renewed his Faretta motion mid-trial, once defendant in this
case was returned from Santa Clara County to San Mateo County, his
conduct throughout the proceedings indicated unequivocally that he
agreed to and acquiesced in being represented by counsel. Although he
spoke more than once, he said and did nothing suggesting any
dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation.
…
Defendants who sincerely seek to represent themselves have a
responsibility to speak up. The world of the trial court is busy and hectic,
and it is to be expected that occasionally a court may omit to rule on a
motion. When that happens, as here, we believe it is reasonable to require
the defendant who wants to take on the task of self-representation to
remind the court of the pending motion. Therefore we hold that on this
7

record, where appellant had both time and opportunity to follow up on his
request for a hearing on his Faretta motion, and failed to do so, he must
be deemed to have abandoned or withdrawn that motion.
Id. at 62 (footnote omitted).
Relying on this reasoning set forth in Kenner, the Arizona Court of Appeals
applied a totality of the circumstances analysis to determine whether the defendant in that
case abandoned his request to proceed pro se. State v. McLemore, 288 P.3d 775, 784-787
(Ariz. App. 2012). The Court identified a non-exhaustive list of factors, including: a
consideration of the defendant’s opportunities to remind the court of a pending motion,
defense counsel’s awareness of the motion, any affirmative conduct by the defendant that
would run counter to a desire for self-representation, whether the defendant waited until
after a conviction to complain about the court’s failure to rule on his or her motion, and
the defendant’s experience in the criminal justice system and with waiving counsel. Id. at
786.
In the present case, Meyers’ attempted assertion of his right of self-representation
was not framed as a clear and unequivocal request that the court take any particular
action. Therefore, it was not an effective assertion of the right. For similar reasons, and
to the extent Meyers’ statement constituted a request, Meyers subsequently abandoned
the request by failing to re-assert it and by proceeding to trial with a different attorney.
Therefore, Meyers has failed to show that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment
rights.
First, while Meyers clearly expressed an intent to exercise his right to represent
himself, he did so in a somewhat confusing manner. In the letter at issue, which was not
framed in the form of a motion, Meyers did not request that the district court take any
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particular action with respect to his representation status. (See R., pp.82-83.) Instead,
Meyers made affirmative statements about his own actions – that he had fired Lorello and
notified Lorello’s supervisor of this decision. (R., p.82.) In other words, the letter reads
not as a request that the district court discharge appointed counsel and allow Meyers to
proceed pro se, but instead as notice to the court that Meyers himself had already set the
wheels in motion for this outcome. Further, after Meyers reported that he had “fired”
Lorello, and notified Lorello’s supervisor of this firing, a different attorney from the
public defender’s office represented Meyers at the court trial, in two post-trial hearings,
and in several post-trial filings. (R., pp.92-96; 113-115, 119-121; Tr., p.73, Ls.5-8,
pp.208, 244.) The appearance of this different attorney seemingly addressed the primary
basis for Meyers’ stated desire to represent himself – his dissatisfaction with Lorello.
Therefore, without further clarification from Meyers about what exactly he wanted the
district court to do, it would have been reasonable for the court to have considered the
matter settled and to have moved forward with the proceeding.
Next, despite the lack of clarity with respect to his letter to the court and his
expressed statement of intent to represent himself, Meyers did not attempt to re-assert the
right prior to the court trial. Instead, at the court trial, Meyers did not inform the court
that there were any pending matters that needed to be addressed. (Tr., p.73, L.4 – p.76,
L.10.)
Finally, Meyers’ mental health issues made it paramount that any request to
represent himself be clearly stated and followed up on. Meyers had three competency
evaluations with varying results. (See Sealed Exhibits.) He was committed to the
custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and was not ruled competent to
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stand trial until the same day he wrote the letter to the court expressing his intent to
represent himself. (R., pp.82-83; Tr., p.68, L.4 – p.71, L.19.) Pursuant to Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 167-178 (2008), a defendant’s mental health issues, even if not
so severe as to render him incompetent to stand trial, may justifiably preclude the
defendant from representing himself.

Further, throughout the underlying criminal

proceeding, Meyers made numerous pro se filings while represented by counsel. (R.,
pp.17-19, 59-64, 65-66, 76-77, 82-83, 99-101, 122.) It was likely difficult for the district
court to determine which portions of these pro se letters and statements constituted
motions or requests that required action, and which did not. The court conducted a
hearing and ruled on the one pro se correspondence from Meyers that was actually
framed as a motion, and not as a letter – his motion for substitute counsel. (R., p.66; Tr.,
p.7, L.25 – p.21, L.19.) In these circumstances, the state asserts that, like the defendant
in Kenner, Meyers had a duty to clearly and unequivocally request to proceed pro se, and
to follow-up on the request with the district court if it was not immediately ruled upon, or
if it was reasonably not construed by the court as a specific and affirmative request to
discharge all representation.
While Meyers clearly expressed an intent to proceed pro se and represent himself
in his letter to the court, Meyers forfeited and abandoned this request by failing to clarify
it or present it in such a manner that required the district court to specifically address it.
Therefore, the district court did not violate Meyers’ Sixth Amendment right of selfrepresentation, and this Court should affirm his conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Meyers’ judgment of
conviction for grand theft.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson____________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of February, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Mark W. Olson____________________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/dd
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